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INTRODUCTION
Medicaid provides access to health care to nearly seventy million lower-
income Americans.1 Traditionally, Medicaid afforded coverage to poor
children, parents, disabled individuals, and the elderly, but the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") allowed states to expand
coverage to all low-income, working-age, non-disabled Americans.2 Like
cash welfare - Temporary Aid for Needy Families ("TANF") or, before it,
Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") - Medicaid is a means-
tested program. But Medicaid and its beneficiaries differ in many respects
from cash welfare programs and those who receive them.4 What might
happen if Medicaid transformed into something resembling cash welfare: a
time-limited welfare program with punitive trappings such as work
requirements, compliance check-ins, and penalties for certain behaviors
identified as "irresponsible"?
The struggle between these competing visions of Medicaid manifests at
both the state and federal levels, and has been gestating for a number of
years.' Since the early 2000s, proponents of the "welfare" model sought to
allow states to reward Medicaid beneficiaries for following stipulated healthy
behaviors or punish beneficiaries for failing to do so.6 Extending this trend,
welfare model proponents recently advocated requiring most adult Medicaid
beneficiaries to work as a condition of program eligibility or maintenance,
notwithstanding the fact that most non-elderly, non-disabled, adult Medicaid
1. CRs. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. July 2017 Medicaid and CHIP Enrollment
Data Highlights, (August 2017), https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/program-
information/medicaid-and-chip-enrollment-data/report-highlights/index.html.
2. See infra, note 56 and associated text.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (describing minimum eligibility requirements for
Medicaid).
4. See infra, note 40 and associated text.
5. See, e.g., Laura Hermer, On the Expansion of "Welfare" and "Health" under
Medicaid, 9 ST. Louis. U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 235, 238-42 (2016).
6. Id. at 238-40.
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beneficiaries already do work. The Obama administration temporarily
arrested this trend through policy changes at the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services ("CMS") and the enactment of the ACA, which expanded
Medicaid to all adults earning less than 133% of the federal poverty level in
participating states without imposing any special requirements on
beneficiaries and in the process treating Medicaid more as a social support
for average, lower-income Americans such as the Earned Income Tax Credit
("EITC") rather than as a welfare program such as TANF.8
Under the Trump administration, however, proponents of a welfare model
of Medicaid are now in power, with ardent, active allies at the federal, state,
and local levels.9 The House of Representative's version of the American
Health Care Act, passed on May 4, 2017, contained a provision allowing
states to impose work requirements on "able-bodied" adult Medicaid
beneficiaries, and gave participating states a five percent increase in their
Federal Medical Assistance Percentages (FMAP) to effectuate the
provision. 0 The Senate's version contained identical provisions.1 Head
administrators at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and
a number of states such as Indiana, Maine, and Wisconsin share this vision,
proposing work requirements and/or time limits across this so-called "able-
bodied" adult Medicaid population. 12 The former Secretary of HHS, Tom
7. See, e.g., INDIANA FAMILY & SOCIAL SERVS. ADMIN., HIP 2.0 Section 1115 Waiver
Application (2014), https://www.in.gov/fssa/hip/files/HIP 2 0 Waiver (Final).pdf; Rachel
Garfield, Robin Rudowitz, & Anthony Damico, Understanding the Intersection of Medicaid
and Work, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-
brief/understanding-the-intersection-of-medicaid-and-work/ (finding that "among the 24
million non-SSI adults (ages 19-64) enrolled in Medicaid in 2015, 6 in 10 (59%) are working
themselves").
8. See, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Affordable Care Act in Action at CMS,
https://www.cms.gov/about-cms/aca/affordable-care-act-in-action-at-cms.html (last visited
Dec. 5, 2017); see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
2001, 124 Stat. 271 (2010).
9. Seema Verma, a proponent of ending Medicaid's entitlement status and implementing
"personal responsibility" requirements in the program, is now the Administrator for the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. As such, she has substantial authority to set
federal Medicaid policy. Ms. Verma helped develop the "Healthy Indiana" program under
then-Governor of Indiana Mike Pence, who is now Vice President of the United States. See,
e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS Leadership,
https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Leadership/index.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2017); see also
Seema Verma, MPH: President-elect Donald Trump's Nominee for Administrator of the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, SIDLEY AUSTIN, LLP (Jan. 2017),
https://www.sidley.com/-/media/update-pdfs/2017/01/trump-hhs-seema-verma-profile-jan-
2017.pdf.
10. See generally, Cong. Budget Off. Cost Estimate, H.R. 1628: American Health Care
Act of 2017 (2017).
11. See generally, Cong. Budget Off. Cost Estimate, H.R. 1628: Better Care
Reconciliation Act of 2017 (2017).
12. See Alice Ollstein, Republicans Have A New Plot To Gut Medicaid And They Don't
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Price, and current CMS Administrator, Seema Verma, expressly welcomed
state § 1115 Medicaid waiver proposals to impose work requirements, 13 and,
to date, six states have either submitted such waiver requests, or are preparing
to do so.14 It is likely only a matter of time before work and/or other welfare
reform-style requirements ("personal responsibility requirements") are
implemented, whether through an altered Medicaid statute at the federal
level, or by granting state § 1115 waiver requests.
Many who believe Medicaid should remain in its traditional form as an
open-ended health care program without welfare trappings argue that
personal responsibility requirements are inappropriate and
counterproductive. 15 These arguments typically are brief, and rest more on
conceptual and policy arguments than on an evaluation of empirical
evidence.16 The question thus arises: what evidence, if any, suggests that
imposing welfare reform-style requirements on certain Medicaid
beneficiaries will yield harmful results to those beneficiaries, or harmful to
Medicaid's programmatic goal of ensuring health care access to low-income
Americans? Given the high probability that personal responsibility
requirements will, at least at some level, go into effect, it bears considering
what to expect.
While one might expect the last two decades to have yielded clear and
Need Congress, TALKING POINTS MEMO, DC (Aug. 17, 2017),
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/medicaid-waivers-trump-hhs.
13. Letter from Thomas E. Price, Sec'y, Dept. of Health & Human Servs., & Seema
Verma, Admin., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to the U.S. Governors (Mar. 14, 2017)
[hereinafter, Letter from Thomas E. Price and Seema Varna to Governors of the United States]
("Today, we reaffirm the agency's commitment to support and complement the various
federal, state, and local programs that have demonstrated success in assisting eligible low-
income adult beneficiaries to improve their economic standing and materially advance in an
effort to rise out of poverty. The best way to improve the long-term health of low-income
Americans is to empower them with skills and employment. It is our intent to use existing
Section 1115 demonstration authority to review and approve meritorious innovations that
build on the human dignity that comes with training, employment and independence."). For
an introduction to § 1115 Medicaid waivers, see, e.g., Hermer, supra note 5, at 237-38.
14. Elizabeth Hinton et al., Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration Waivers: A Look at the
Current Landscape of Approved and Pending Waivers, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Aug. 16,
2017), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/section- 115-medicaid-demonstration-
waivers-a-look-at-the-current-landscape-of-approved-and-pending-waivers/.
15. See, e.g., Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, Health Care and the Myth of Self-
Reliance, 57 B.C. L. REv. 1, 6, 15 (2015); Sidney D. Watson, Out of the Black Box and Into
the Light: Using Section 1115 Waivers to Implement the Affordable Care Act's Medicaid
Expansion, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. ETHICS 213, 227 (2015).
16. Huberfeld & Roberts, supra note 15, at 6, 15 (observing that most families with
Medicaid already have at least one worker and arguing that such requirements rely on a myth
that receipt of means-tested government benefits breeds dependency); Watson, supra note 15,
at 227 (noting that "work requirements and incentives are not "likely to assist in promoting
the objectives' of the Medicaid program," and moreover contradict "the ACA's new inclusive
social insurance system").
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substantial evidence of the consequences of state-implemented work
requirements in the TANF program, this is not the case.1 7 Inadequate
collection of data, large loopholes in work requirements, and some states'
widely differing implementation policies at the county level makes it difficult
to tell, with reliable certainty, what impact work requirements alone had on
TANF take-up and retention, let alone any applicability such data might have
to Medicaid.18 That being said, existing data suggests that such requirements
in TANF are associated with reduced cash welfare retention and reduced
provision of cash benefits.19 Existing data also suggests that time limits are
associated, at least in some situations, with reduced uptake and retention.20
The data from TANF would be more useful if the program were
implemented uniformly across each state, and if the effects of state policy
choices on beneficiary take-up, retention, and outcomes were tracked through
careful data collection and analysis. If personal responsibility requirements
are imposed in Medicaid, we should similarly insist, to the extent it is
feasible, on uniform program implementation and thorough, well-considered
collection of data to better study their effects.
The first section of this article provides a brief overview and history of
welfare reform-style requirements in Medicaid, and considers pending
waiver requests to date, under the Trump administration. The second section
evaluates issues with the legality of these pending waiver requests. The third
section evaluates existing data on time limits and work requirements in the
TANF program, and considers, based on this data, how such requirements
might play out if implemented in state Medicaid programs. The article
concludes that while time limits will likely have a negative effect on
Medicaid uptake and retention, as well as on beneficiary health, the negative
effects of work requirements, to the extent that evidence exists for them, may
be more limited.
I. OVERVIEW AND HISTORY OF WELFARE REFORM-STYLE
REQUIREMENTS IN MEDICAID
Personal responsibility requirements in means-tested welfare programs are
17. See infra, note 18 and associated text.
18. See Lynn A. Karoly, RAND, Estimating the Effect of Work Requirements on Welfare
Recipients: A Synthesis of the National Literation (2001),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2005/CT185.pdf; see also Jeffrey
Grogger et al., RAND, Consequences of Welfare Reform: A Research Synthesis (2002),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/consequencesofwelfarereform.pdf.
19. LaDonna Pavetti, Work Requirements Don't Cut Poverty, Evidence Shows, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES (June 7, 2016), https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-
inequality/work-requirements-dont-cut-poverty-evidence-shows; Hinton et al., supra note 14,
at 1,9.
20. Grogger et al., supra note 18, at xvi-xvii, 13.
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nothing new.21 The policies underlying public welfare programs in the United
States - typically cash welfare, housing, and/or food - evidence a
thoroughgoing skepticism about the deservingness and trustworthiness of
those they serve.22 Work requirements in particular have a long history,
tracing their genesis to well before the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601.23 This
section examines these requirements as implemented in cash welfare and in
Medicaid over time, and as proposed to date under the Trump administration.
A. Personal Responsibility Requirements in Cash Welfare and in
Medicaid Prior to the Obama Administration
Early American colonists continued the Elizabethan Poor Laws' tradition
of local, decentralized responsibility for providing relief to the poor while
requiring those who were not too sick, old, pregnant, or disabled to work.24
While policies and rules varied widely by town, county, and state, the able-
bodied were generally required to work, whether they lived on their own or,
as was more common during the 19th century, in publicly funded
poorhouses.2 5 Many localities provided both "indoor" relief- welfare
provided through residence in poorhouses - and "outdoor" relief- welfare
provided to those who lived outside of poorhouses or other institutions. 6
However, the perception that outdoor relief engendered laziness and
21. See generally William P. Quigley, Five Hundred Years of English Poor Laws, 1349-
1834: Regulating the Working and Nonworking Poor, 30 AKRON L. REv. 73 (1996)
[hereinafter, Five Hundred Years of English Poor Laws].
22. Id. at 92-93 (discussing the punishment of vagrants in a law enacted by Parliament in
1531).
23. For a detailed examination of these requirements over time, see id. (discussing the
genesis and evolution of laws regulating work, begging, vagrancy, and poorhouses in England
from the Statute of Laborers of 1349-1350 through the Reform of the Poor Laws of 1834).
24. William P. Quigley, Work or Starve: Regulation of the Poor in Colonial America, 31
U.S.F.L. REV. 35, 42-48 (1996) [hereinafter, Work or Starve] (tracing the origins of colonial
approaches to poor relief to the English Poor Laws, modified by Puritanism and local
conditions); see also James W. Fox, Jr., Citizenship, Poverty, and Federalism: 1787 1882, 60
U. PiTT. L. REv. 421, 457 (1999) ("The laws governing the poor in colonial America were
modeled after the English Poor Laws, which had been comprehensively codified by 1601. The
main attributes of these early laws included: local control and responsibility, with some
national (English) supervision; a mandate that those who were able-bodied had to work and
could be sold into a form of enforced servitude; shaming as an appropriate punishment,
including public branding and incarceration for non-work; a legal obligation for families of
the poor to care for children and the elderly; use of forced apprenticeship for needy children;
and public provision of food and medical care for the poor who were physically or mentally
unable to work or obtain family support." (internal citations omitted)).
25. MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
WELFARE IN AMERICA 38-40 (1986); but see also E. Munsterberg, Poor Relief in the United
States: View of a German Expert, 7 AM. J. Soc. 501, 518-19, 522-23 (1902) (observing that,
in many of the largest cities, outdoor relief had been entirely eliminated, even for those who
are unable to work due to age or disability).
26. KATZ, supra note 25, at 41-43.
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immorality among the poor led to reductions in the amount of outdoor relief
as the 1 9 th century progressed.
Although most American poorhouses were eliminated by the 1930s, public
sentiment about welfare recipients remained skeptical.28 Aid to Dependent
Children - a cooperative federal/state program enacted as part of the Social
Security Act of 1935 and later broadened in the 1960s and renamed Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) - became a lightning rod for
those who saw it as taxpayer funding for sloth, vice, and unwed
motherhood.29 This negative view not only persisted but grew during the
1980s, when some states sought and obtained waivers to implement work
requirements in their cash welfare programs in the 1980s." Building on this
trend, in 1996 a Republican Congress, aided by President Bill Clinton,
enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act
("PRWORA").31 PRWORA ended cash welfare as an entitlement by block-
granting federal funding to states, imposing a five-year, lifetime limit on
benefits, and devolving most of the authority to develop rules for the new
program, TANF to the states.32 PRWORA requires states to ensure that fifty
percent of its TANF recipients work or are involved in other qualifying
activities, although there is substantial variability in the implementation of
the requirement due to flexibility in law and associated regulations.3 Under
PRWORA, states also maintain considerable discretion to decide how to
spend their block grants, whether on cash welfare to TANF recipients, work
and training support, marriage promotion activities, child protective services,
27. Id. at 18-19, 41-43; see also Kenneth Hudson & Andrea Coukos, The Dark Side of
the Protestant Ethic: A Comparative Analysis of Welfare Reform, 23 Soc. THEORY 1, 7-9, 12-
13 (2005) (discussing, inter alia, widespread public belief that charity and welfare encourages
the able-bodied poor to laziness and dependency, and the role that this belief has played in
American welfare policy).
28. Peter L. Szanton, The Remarkable "Quango": Knowledge, Politics, and Welfare
Reform, 10 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT 590, 592 (1991).
29. Id. (observing that, while "early recipients had been seen as victims of fate; many
now seemed casually and voluntarily dependent").
30. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, BLAME WELFARE, IGNORE
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 182 (2007) ("[b]y 1996, there were waivers in forty-three states.
Some states cut benefits; others offered work incentives, including combining welfare with
work, transitional child care and health care"); Szanton, supra note 28, at 592, 595-97 (noting
that roughly half of all states developed demonstration programs in their Aid to Families with
Dependent Children programs in the 1980s, and discussing the work of the Manpower
Demonstration Research Corporation to evaluate the programs); see also Pamela Loprest et
al., Welfare Reform under PRWORA: Aid to Children with Working Families?, 14 TAX POL'Y
& THE ECON 157, 161-62 (2000).
31. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42, 8, & 7 U.S.C.).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 603(a) (2017); 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (2017).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 607(a)-(d) (2017); see also KATZ, supra note 25 and associated text.
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or otherwise.3 4
Joel Handler and Yeheskel Hasenfeld characterize the negative attitudes
toward the poor and the programs that help them, including PRWORA, as
follows:
[u]nless welfare programs are harsh and stigmatizing, [single mothers on
welfare] will be encouraged to have children, shun marriage, and
perpetuate dependency. Who would choose welfare over a "normal"
family life? Only those women who lack the proper values of majoritarian
America.
35
Scholars have identified the recurring nature of negative themes in U.S.
welfare policy. 36 Among them: welfare should be a last resort, and should be
a worse alternative than working in a low-wage job; poor people who can
work should work; and welfare is harmful to the poor.3  The underlying
concern connecting these views is that the use of social welfare programs
leads to dependence, to the detriment of both the beneficiary and society.3 8
Welfare, according to this theory, encourages laziness, dependence, and
immorality, all on the public fisc.
39
Unlike cash welfare, Congress did not treat Medicaid as a handout
34. 42 U.S.C. § 604(a)-(h) (2017); see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE
REFORM: EARLY FISCAL EFFECTS OF THE TANF BLOCK GRANT 7-8 (1998) (..."[S]tate MOE
[maintenance of effort] funds may be used with more flexibility than TANF funds. TANF
grant funds may be used for cash assistance, child care assistance, work placement programs,
subsidized work programs and other efforts not specifically prohibited by PRWORA. MOE
funds can be used not only for these purposes but also to provide benefits to some recipients
excluded from TANF assistance. States make these budgetary decisions as part of their regular
appropriations process.").
35. HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 30, at 151.
36. See, e.g., id. at 151-85 (noting these features, particularly as applied to women of
color and notwithstanding the rehabilitative interlude of the War on Poverty); Five Hundred
Years of English Poor Laws, supra note 21, at 103-06 (detailing similarities between these
ideas as instantiated in PRWORA and the English Poor Laws); Margaret R. Somers & Fred
Block, From Poverty to Perversity: Ideas, Markets, and Institutions over200 Years of Welfare,
70 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REv., 260, 277-80 (2005) (detailing the Malthusian underpinnings of
these ideas as expressed by conservative U.S. scholars); Hudson & Coukos, supra note 27, at
8-13 (showing connections between these ideas as expressed by conservative U.S. scholars
and those embedded in Puritan theology).
37. HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 30, at 151-85; Five Hundred Years of English
Poor Laws, supra note 21, at 103-06; Somers & Block, supra note 36, at 277-80; Hudson &
Coukos, supra note 27, at 8-13.
38. See generally, HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 30; Five Hundred Years of
English Poor Laws, supra note 21; Somers & Block, supra note 36; Hudson & Coukos, supra
note 27.
39. HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 30, at 151-85; Five Hundred Years of English
Poor Laws, supra note 21, at 103-06; Somers & Block, supra note 36, at 277-80; Hudson &
Coukos, supra note 27, at 8-13.
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begetting indolence, vice, and sloth when PRWORA was enacted.40
Medicaid and cash welfare had been tightly linked for most of Medicaid's
existence. When it enacted PRWORA, Congress separated Medicaid from
the new TANF program and preserved Medicaid intact.
41
The subsequent twenty years saw an increased push among many right-
wing politicians and policy advocates, not merely to weaken provisions that
protect many beneficiaries from meaningful out-of-pocket expenses and
guarantee a rich panoply of benefits to all beneficiaries in all regions of each
state, but also to label Medicaid as yet another expensive and dependence-
creating government handout that discourages the poor from pulling
themselves out of poverty.42 Although subsequent Republican attempts failed
to block-grant Medicaid, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 successfully
raised cost-sharing amounts for Medicaid beneficiaries earning more than
100% of the federal poverty level ("FPL") and allowed states to offer
"benchmark" benefits closely resembling the more limited benefits offered
in private health insurance plans to certain categories of beneficiaries.43
At the same time, several states sought Medicaid § 1115 waivers that
undercut Medicaid's status as a public entitlement program that offers a
standard set of benefits to categorical and optional beneficiaries." Utah, for
example, successfully obtained a waiver that diminished benefits for certain
categorically-eligible beneficiaries in order to pay for minimal primary care
benefits for individuals who are not otherwise eligible for Medicaid.45 Florida
obtained permission from the Bush administration to require Medicaid
beneficiaries in several counties to pick among different private managed
care plans and use a health savings account, or else forego coverage until
automatic enrollment, all in the name of "training" them how to use private
40. Marilyn R. Ellwood & Leighton Ku, Welfare and Immigration Reforms: Unintended
Side-Effects for Medicaid, 17 HEALTH AFFAIRS 137, 138 (1998).
41. Id. ("PRWORA tried to minimize the adverse effects of welfare reform on Medicaid
by decoupling welfare and Medicaid"). Republicans in Congress wanted to block-grant
Medicaid at the same time it enacted PRWORA. See, e.g., Nancy E. Roman, WelWare Bill
Debate to Exclude Medicaid, WASHINGTON TMMES (July 18, 1996) (discussing the negotiations
that took place between House Republicans, who were moving forward with a bill that would
both block-grant both Medicaid and AFDC, and President Clinton, who, as then-press
specialist for the House Ways and Means Committee Ari Fleischer noted, "would veto a
welfare-Medicaid bill"). President Clinton, however, insisted that the Medicaid provisions be
removed from the welfare reform provisions as a condition of ultimately signing PRWORA
into law, and the Republicans agreed. Roman, supra; see also Richard Wolf, House Tries
Again at Welfare Reform, USA TODAY (July 18, 1996); Huberfeld & Roberts, supra note 15,
at 7.
42. Huberfeld & Roberts, supra note 15, at 7.
43. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 7, 12, 19, 20, 26, 28, 29, 42, 47 U.S.C.).
44. See infra note 47, 53, 54, (showing various 1115 waiver requests by many states).
45. Utah Department of Health, Utah 1115 Demonstration Waiver (2016).
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coverage.46 Indiana, too, sought to "train" a subset of its otherwise uninsured,
lower-income, adult population to be responsible and use private, high-
deductible health plans funded in part by Medicaid dollars diverted, via a §
1115 waiver, from hospitals providing care to low-income Medicaid and
uninsured patients.4 West Virginia obtained permission to require Medicaid
families with dependent children to opt for an "enhanced" benefit package
by signing a "personal responsibility" pledge or else be automatically shunted
into a "basic" benefit package lacking certain inpatient psychiatric services,
certain rehabilitative and weight management services, and prescription drug
benefits, among others.48
B. Personal Responsibility Requirements in Medicaid Under the Obama
Administration
Under the Obama administration, these experiments briefly faded.
However, they were given new life when the Supreme Court made the
Affordable Care Act's Medicaid expansion optional.49  The Obama
administration became willing to entertain proposals from majority-
Republican states seeking § 1115 waivers to experiment with certain features
of their Medicaid programs, in exchange for expanding Medicaid 0.5 As such,
46. Joan Alker & Lisa Portelli, Understanding Florida's Medicaid Reform Legislation, 4
WINTER PARK HEALTH FOUND. 1, 7 (2005).
47. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Healthy Indiana Plan: Special Terms and
Conditions, 2 (2007) (discussing how the state allocated 40% of its disproportionate share
hospital (DSH) funds to the program); see IND. FAMILY & Soc. SERVS. ADMIN., The Healthy
Indiana Plan: Section 1115 Affordable Choices Demonstration Proposal 1, 41-42 (2007).
48. WEST VIRGINIA BUREAU FOR MEDICAL SERVS., MEDICAID PROVIDER MANUAL, §§
527.1; 527.4; 527.4.1; 527.4.2; Appendix 2 & Appendix 4 (2009) ("The goal of Mountain
Health Choices is to promote health and reward Medicaid members who choose to be
personally responsible for their own healthcare and to adopt healthier lifestyles."). Mountain
Health Choices expired in 2013. See, e.g., The Use of Healthy Behavior Incentives in Medicaid
MACPAC. 5, 1, 14 (2016), https://www.macpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/The-Use-of-
Healthy-B ehavior-Incentives-in-Medicad.pdf.
49. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 576 (2012) (requiring states to
expand Medicaid to all non-elderly, non-disabled adults earning up to 133% of the federal
poverty level). While the Court struck down the mandatory nature of the expansion, "[n]othing
in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds under the Affordable Care Act to
expand the availability of health care, and requiring that all States accepting such funds comply
with the conditions on their use. What Congress is not free to do is to penalize States that
choose not to participate in that new program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding.
Section 1396c gives the Secretary of Health and Human Services the authority to do just that.
It allows her to withhold all 'further [Medicaid] payments ... to the State' if she determines
that the State is out of compliance with any Medicaid requirement, including those contained
in the expansion. ... In light of the Court's holding, the Secretary cannot apply §1396 to
withdraw existing Medicaid funds for failure to comply with the requirements set out in the
expansion." Id. at 585.
50. Elizabeth Mann & Molly E. Reynolds, Republican-Controlled States Might be
Trump's Best Hope to Reform Health Care, BROOKINGS (Aug. 17, 2017),
2018
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seven Republican-led states sought to impose even bolder changes to their
Medicaid programs than previously made under the Bush Administration."
While the details of these expansions differed, some common themes
emerged 2.5 First, several states sought to accomplish the expansion using
private coverage. 3 Second, several states wanted to eliminate certain
traditionally generous features of Medicaid not typically found in private
plans, such as coverage of non-emergency medical transportation costs and
three-month retroactive eligibility. 54 Finally, several states sought to impose
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2017/08/17/republican-controlled-states-might-be-
trumps-best-hope-to-reform-health-care/.
51. See infra, note 56.
52. See infra, notes 53, 54, and 55.
53. ARKANSAS CENTER FOR HEALTH IMPROVEMENT, Arkansas Health Care Independence
Program ("Private Option"): Proposed Evaluation for § 1115 Demonstration Waiver (2014),
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-
topics/waivers/ I115/downloads/ar/health-care-independence-program-private-option/ar-
private-option-demo-waiver-proposed-eval-02202014.pdf ("Through a Section 1115
demonstration waiver, the State will utilize premium assistance to secure private health
coverage offered on the newly formed individual health insurance marketplace (the
Marketplace) to individuals who are ages 19-64 years with incomes at or below 138 percent
of the federal poverty level (FPL)"); Letter from Andrew Slavitt, Acting Administrator, CMS,
to Chris Priest, Director, Michigan Medical Services Administration (Dec. 17, 2015)
(". . .[B]eginning on April 1, 2018, which is 48 months after the initial implementation of the
Healthy Michigan Plan, all beneficiaries in the demonstration with incomes above 100 percent
of the FPL and who are not medically frail will have the opportunity to choose between
coverage through a Healthy Michigan Plan or through a Qualified Health Plan offered on the
Marketplace..."); Letter from Andrew Slavitt, Acting Administrator, Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services, to Nicholas A. Toumpas, Commissioner, New Hampshire Department of
Health and Human Services (March 4, 2015) ("The demonstration will affect non-medically
frail individuals aged 19-64 in the new adult coverage group. The approved demonstration
provides authority to New Hampshire to provide premium assistance to such individuals in
the new adult group to enable them to enroll in qualified health plans (QHPs) offered in the
Marketplace").
54. Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Administrator, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, to Jennifer Vermeer, Medicaid Director, State of Iowa (Dec. 10, 2013) ("Under the
demonstration, the state is relieved of the responsibility to assure non-emergency medical
transportation to and from the providers"); CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., Healthy
Indiana Plan 2.0 Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration Fact Sheet 2 (2015) ("The
demonstration provides authority for the state to not offer non-emergency medical
transportation (NEMT) for the new adult group during the first year of the demonstration; this
authority may be extended subject to evaluation regarding the impact of this policy on access
to care. Also reflecting the unique design of HIP 2.0, coverage will be effective: 1) the first
day in the month in which an individual makes a POWER account contribution; or, for those
with incomes at or below 100 percent of the FPL who do not make a POWER account
contribution, coverage will start 2) the first of the month in which the 60 days payment period
expires"); Letter from Andrew Slavitt, Acting Administrator, CMS, to Nicholas A. Toumpas,
Commissioner, New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services ("The
demonstration includes a conditional waiver of retroactive coverage, with implementation of
the waiver conditioned upon receipt of data demonstrating that the state's coverage system
provides a seamless eligibility determination experience the beneficiary that ensures that the
beneficiary will not have periods of uninsurance").
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"personal responsibility" requirements on beneficiaries, ranging from
incentives to utilize preventive health measures to imposing higher
copayments or requiring beneficiaries to work in order to remain enrolled.55
Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Montana and New
Hampshire obtained waivers from CMS allowing them to charge at least
some expansion beneficiaries copayments, coinsurance, or contributions to
be added to health savings accounts (termed by requesting states as
"premiums"). 6 In the case of contributions to health savings accounts,
beneficiaries making the required payments of these premiums can use them
toward out-of-pocket costs for care. In some cases, contributions to health
savings accounts are made in lieu of cost-sharing.58 Additionally, in some
states, if beneficiaries obtain preventive services, they are allowed to pay no
premiums, pay lower premiums, and/or roll premium contributions over from
year to year.59 Moreover, several of these states obtained permission to
55. Jane B. Wishner et al., Medicaid Expansion, the Private Option, and Personal
Responsibility Requirements: The Use of Section 1115 Waivers to Implement Medicaid
Expansion Under the A CA, 4 URB. INST. (2015).
56. CTRS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Special Terms and Conditions: Arizona
Health Care Cost Containment System Medicaid Section 1115 Demonstration 12-13 (2012)
https://www.azahcccs.gov/Members/Downloads/KidsCarell!AZSNCPProtocolApproval-
STCs.pdf; CTRS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Special Terms and Conditions, Arkansas
Works 18-19 (2016) https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ar/ar-works-ca.pdf; CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV.,
Special Terms and Conditions, Healthy Indiana Plan 2.0 17-31 (2015)
https://www.medicaid.gov/MedicaidCHIPProgramlnformation/ByTopics/Waivers/ 115/dow
nloads/in/in-healthy-indiana-plan-support-20-pa5.pdf; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., Special Terms and Conditions, Iowa Marketplace Choice Plan 16-19 (2014)
https://dhs.iowa.gov/sites/default/files/Marketplace%20Choice%20STCs%20NEMT%20Am
endment%202015%207.30.2015.pdf; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Special
Terms and Conditions, Healthy Michigan Section 1115 Demonstration 12-17 (2017)
https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/mi/mi-healthy-michigan-ca.pdf; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., Special Terms and Conditions, Montana Health and Economic Livelihood
Partnership (HELP) Program Demonstration 10-12 (2016)
http://dphhs.mt.gov/Portals/85/hrd/documents/I1 15/ApprovedMTHELPSectioni 1115Waiver.
pdf; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Special Terms and Conditions, New
Hampshire Health Protection Program Premium Assistance 17, 32 (2017)
https://www.medicaid.gov/MedicaidCHIPProgramlnformation/ByTopics/Waivers/ 115/dow
nloads/nh/nh-health-protection-program-premium-assistance-ca.pdf.
57. See Healthy Indiana Plan 2.0, supra note 56, at 8; Healthy Michigan Section 1115
Demonstration, supra note 56, at 12-13; Montana Health and Economic Livelihood
Partnership, supra note 56, at 2.
58. Healthy Indiana Plan 2.0, supra note 56, at 22; Healthy Michigan Section 1115
Demonstration, supra note 56, at 12-13; Montana Health and Economic Livelihood
Partnership Montana Health and Economic Livelihood Partnership, supra note 56 at 2; Iowa
Marketplace Choice Plan, supra note 56 at 17.
59. Healthy Indiana Plan 2.0, supra note 56, at 2, 23; Iowa Marketplace Choice Plan,
supra note 56, at 48; Healthy Michigan Section 1115 Demonstration, supra note 56, at 2, 13-
15.
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disenroll beneficiaries earning more than the federal poverty level if they fail
to pay the required premiums.60 Some states additionally or alternatively
provide noncompliant, higher-earning beneficiaries with only a limited
benefit package. 61 In Arizona, Iowa, and Montana, a beneficiary can re-enroll
by paying what they owe.62 In Indiana, however, beneficiaries who are
disenrolled for non-payment can be prohibited from resuming coverage for
six months. 63 Arizona, Indiana, Michigan, and Montana justified their
personal responsibility provisions as ostensibly helping beneficiaries become
better consumers of health care services, often with an eye toward pushing
them into private coverage.64
While the Obama administration allowed the waiver features discussed
above, it disallowed others on the ground that they did not support the
objectives of Medicaid and could hinder access to care.65 For example,
Arizona sought to impose non-nominal cost-sharing onto expansion
beneficiaries earning less than the federal poverty level, exclude beneficiaries
from coverage for six months if they fail to timely contribute to their health
spending account, impose a work requirement, charge fees for missed
60. Healthy Indiana Plan 2.0, supra note 56; Arizona Health Care Cost Containment
System, supra note 56, at 21; Iowa Marketplace Choice Plan, supra note 56, at 49; Montana
Health and Economic Livelihood Partnership (HELP), supra note 56, at 10. (explaining
beneficiaries earning over the federal poverty level can be disenrolled; those earning 100% or
less of the federal poverty level cannot be disenrolled, but their unpaid share is counted as a
debt against them).
61. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Healthy Indiana Plan (HIP) 2.0, 24 (2015)
https://www.in.gov/fssa/hip/files/HIPCMSApproved-STCTechnicalCorrections_5.14.1
5.pdf; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Healthy Michigan Section 1115
Demonstration, supra note 56, at 11.
62. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System, supra note 56, at 23; Iowa
Marketplace Choice Plan, supra note 56, at 49; Montana Health and Economic Livelihood
Partnership (HELP), supra note 56, at 2 (explaining beneficiaries earning over the federal
poverty level can be reenrolled upon payment of their liability or upon assessment of the debt
against them by the state).
63. See Health Indiana Plan 2.0 Fact Sheet, supra note 53, at 2.
64. See Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System, supra note 56, at 39 (giving one
goal as "transitioning eligible enrollees in the Demonstration to Medicaid, the Exchange or
other coverage options"); Health Indiana Plan 2.0 supra note 61, at 8 ("Robust participation
in Gateway to Work will encourage member self-sufficiency and foster an eventual transition
to the private market"); Healthy Michigan 1115 Demonstration, supra note 61, at 3 (stating
that the goals of the plan include an examination of, "Whether the availability of affordable
health insurance, which provides coverage for preventive and health and wellness activities,
will increase healthy behaviors and improve health outcomes"); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., Montana Health and Economic Livelihood Partnership (HELP) Program
Demonstration (2016)
http://dphhs.mt.gov/Portals/85/hrd/documents/11 15/ApprovedMTHELPSectionl 11l5Waiver
pdf ("Premiums and copayment liability will encourage HELP Program enrollees to be
discerning health care purchasers, take personal responsibility for their health care decisions
and develop health-conscious behaviors as consumers of health care services.").
65. See Letter from Andrew Slavitt to Thomas Betlach, infra note 66.
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appointments and impose both monthly income and work verification
requirements and a five-year lifetime limit on coverage. 6 However, CMS did
not approve these features.6 Other states wanted to impose work
requirements, but the Obama administration only permitted states to offer
voluntary employment support activities and did not consider them to be part
of any granted waiver.68
C. Waiver Requests Involving Personal Responsibility Requirements
Under the Trump Administration
Under the Trump administration, the situation is different. One of now-
former Secretary Price's and Administrator Verma's first acts following their
confirmations was to issue a joint letter to state governors, "ushering in a new
era for the federal and state Medicaid partnership where states have more
freedom to design programs that meet the spectrum of diverse needs of their
Medicaid population.- 69 They promised to "fast-track" waiver approvals and
demonstration extensions, and noted special interest in demonstrations
seeking to impose work requirements and provisions that "align" Medicaid
and private coverage for non-disabled adults. v
Some states accepted the offer, or are in the process of doing so.71 For
example, Arizona plans to resubmit its original waiver request, including the
66. Letter from Andrew Slavitt, Acting Administrator, Ctrs for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs., to Thomas Betlach, Director, Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System (Sept.
30, 2016) at 3 [hereinafter, Letter from Andrew Slavitt to Thomas Betlach]
https://www.medicaid.gov/MedicaidCHIPProgramlnformation/ByTopics/Waivers/1 115/dow
nloads/az/Health-Care-Cost-Containment-System/az-hccc-demo-ext-09302016.pdf.; see also
Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System, supra note 56, at 16-18.
67. See Letter from Andrew Slavitt to Thomas Betlach, supra note 66, at 2-3.
68. One goal of Kentucky's pending application is to "[e]mpower people to seek
employment and transition to commercial health insurance coverage." CABINET FOR HEALTH
& FAM. SERVS, KENTUCKY HEALTH WAIVER APPLICATION 13 (2016)
http://chfs.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/A7F17FE37E2D40EFB4045D8D12DB9EAB/0/62216Kent
uckyHEALTHWaiverProposal.pdf (describing how the now-terminated "Healthy
Pennsylvania" waiver originally sought to impose a work requirement, but the state ultimately
instead opted to provide optional job encouragement services that CMS did not consider to be
part of the waiver); see Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Administrator, Ctrs. Medicare &
Medicaid Servs., to Beverly Mackereth, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Pub. Welfare
2 (August 18, 2014); Ind. Family & Social Servs. Admin., Healthy Indiana Plan Draft
Evaluation Design 48 (2015) https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-
Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1 15/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthy-
indiana-plan-support-20-draft-state-eval-design-06012015.pdf (noting how Indiana attached a
voluntary work referral program ("Gateway to Work") to its waiver. CMS did not include it
as part of the waiver, but Indiana made it clear in its evaluation plan that it considers Gateway
to Work to be part of the waiver plan and included it as an express waiver evaluation goal).
69. Letter from Thomas Price and Seema Verma to Governors of the United States, supra
note 13.
70. Id. at 2.
71. Id.
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previously-requested five-year lifetime limitation on coverage for the
expansion population and work requirements. 2 Maine submitted a waiver
request seeking permission to impose work requirements for "able-bodied"
applicants who request more than three months of coverage every three
years. Maine also seeks, among other things, to eliminate both retroactive
eligibility and hospital determinations of presumptive eligibility for most
beneficiaries, ostensibly to encourage people to apply when healthy for
coverage rather than waiting until they are sick.7' Two of Maine's three stated
goals for its waiver request are "[t]o promote financial independence and
transitions to employer sponsored or other commercial health insurance" and
"[t]o encourage individual responsibility for one's health and health care
costs."
75
Wisconsin proposes to charge double the premium to beneficiaries who
fail to control so-called "health risk behaviors" - use of alcohol, illicit drugs,
or cigarettes, being overweight, or not using seatbelts.6 It wants permission
to impose a 48-month time limit on all expansion adults age 18-49 that can
be tolled only if the beneficiary is engaged in eligible work activities.
Wisconsin also proposes to question all applicants about illicit drug use and
test those whose responses indicate they may have a problem. 7S Those who
test positive without a valid prescription must enter treatment, if available, or
else lose eligibility for benefits.
72. Id.
73. MAINE DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., Section 1115 Waiver Application Draft
5-7 (2017) [hereinafter, Maine Waiver Application],
http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/oms/documents/DraftMaineCare- 115_application.pdf.
74. Id. at 11-12; MaineCare Services, Section 1115 Demonstration Waiver-Maine Care
Reform (Sept. 9, 2017), http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/oms/rules/demonstration-waivers.shtml
(Maine had additionally proposed charging beneficiaries for missed physician appointments,
but removed this provision in the submitted waiver request); Letter from Ricker Hamilton,
Acting Commissioner Dept. of Health and Human Servs., to Thomas E. Price, U.S. Sec. of
Health & Human Servs. 58 (Aug. 1, 2017) [hereinafter, Letter from Ricker Hamilton to
Thomas E. Price]
http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/oms/rules/MaineCare- 115_application_080217_to%20submit.
pdf.
75. Maine Waiver Application, supra note 73, at 4.
76. Letter from Michael Heifetz, Medicaid Dir., State of Wis., to, Brian Neale, Deputy
Admin., Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs. 8-9 (June 7, 2017),
https ://www.dhs.wisconsin.govlbadgercareplus/clawaiver-finalapp.pdf.
77. Id. at 10. (differing from Arizona's proposed limit, Wisconsin does not have a lifetime
limit. Rather, once a beneficiary has been covered for 48 months, excluding periods of tolling,
then he will lose coverage and may reapply only after six months have passed).
78. Id. at 11-12.
79. Id. Programs of this sort have been shown to be administratively complex and costly,
with little benefit. See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, No Savings Are Found from Welfare Drug Tests,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/18/us/no-savings-found-in-
florida-welfare-drug-tests.html.
Vol. 27
2018 What to Expect When You're Expecting
These are not the only states that seek, or are likely to seek, restrictive
waivers with personal responsibility requirements. However, they exemplify
the direction that some states are moving with respect to their Medicaid
programs.8" These states are willing to accept a somewhat less restrictive
view of Medicaid eligibility, but only if they are allowed to use Medicaid as
a tool to reshape beneficiaries' lives.81
II. CHALLENGES TO WAIVER REQUESTS
At the time of this writing, twenty-one waiver requests have been
submitted to CMS during the Trump administration.8 2 Requests for Medicaid
waivers under § 1115 of the Social Security Act must meet a number of
requirements to be lawfully granted.83 Here, I examine the requirement that
§ 1115 waivers may only be granted if the Secretary finds they are, "likely to
assist in promoting the objectives of title ... XIX."84 Congress enacted
Medicaid to provide "medical assistance on behalf of families with dependent
children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose income and
resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services.""
Unlike the purpose of TANF or even the former AFDC statute, Medicaid's
statement of purpose does not reflect an objective that beneficiaries should
strive to become self-supporting by obtaining jobs.86 Both waiver-seeking
80. Indiana, Arkansas, Kentucky, and Utah are among additional states either seeking
permission to impose personal responsibility requirements or considering doing so. For more
information see, e.g., Hinton et al., supra note 14.
81. This policy orientation is based on the writings of Lawrence Mead and others who
seek to use welfare programs to "tell the poor what to do." See Mead, infra note 192 and
associated text.
82. See Hinton et al., supra note 14.
83. See generally, 42 C.F.R. 431 (2016) (providing rules for requesting and obtaining a
Medicaid or CHIP § 1115 waiver, including requirements for state and federal public notice,
specific content in the application, and waiver monitoring, compliance, and evaluation); see
also Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1069 (9th Cir. 1994) (providing that "[o]n its face, the
statute allows waivers only (1) for experimental, demonstration or pilot projects, which (2) in
the judgment of the Secretary are likely to assist in promoting the objectives of the Social
Security Act and only (3) for the extent and period she finds necessary. Thus, while the
Secretary has considerable discretion to decide which projects meet these criteria, she must,
at a minimum, examine each of these issues").
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(1) (2014); Title XIX is where Medicaid is codified.
85. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, COMPILATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAWS,
https://www.ssa.gov/OP-Home/ssact/titlel9/1901.htm; 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2017).
(appropriating financial assistance to families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or
disable individuals); see also California Welfare Rights Org. v. Richardson, 348 F. Supp. 491
(1972) (holding that the "California co-payment experiment" was not in excess of the authority
vested in the Secretary to approve experimental, pilot, or demonstration projects).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (1997). TANF's purpose is to "(1) provide assistance to needy
families so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; (2)
end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation,
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states and the Secretary of Health and Human Services must keep the
objectives of Medicaid in mind when drafting and evaluating waiver
requests, as failure to adhere to them may result in either denial of the
waiver, or a judicial finding that the grant was improper.88 Notably, HHS
work, and marriage; (3) prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and
establish annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these
pregnancies; and (4) encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families." TANF
clearly contemplates moving recipients off of TANF and other programs and into the
workforce. AFDC's purpose, in contrast, was to "encourage[e] the care of dependent children
in their own homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State to furnish financial
assistance and rehabilitation and other services .. to needy dependent children and the parents
or relatives with whom they are living to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help
such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and
personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and
protection...." 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1995). While aspects of the language of AFDC's purpose may
appear analogous to Medicaid's purpose, the fact that AFDC (and now TANF) provided cash
benefits, whereas Medicaid provides health benefits, is salient. The primary - and often in the
case of low-wage jobs, sole - form of compensation for employment is money. Only some
jobs, however, additionally provide benefits such as health insurance. See, e.g., KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. EMP. HEALTH BENEFITS 2016 ANNUAL SURVEY (2016),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Employer-Health-Benefits-2016-Annual-Survey. Low-
wage jobs, in particular, rarely provide health insurance, yet these are precisely the jobs that
Medicaid beneficiaries are likely to have or obtain. Id. The reason for this becomes clear when
one considers that the annual wages for low-wage jobs are often little more, or even less, than
the average cost of an employer-sponsored health insurance policy. Id. For further information
about this subject, see, e.g., Sara R. Collins et al., On the Edge: Low Wage Workers and Their
Health Insurance Coverage, 38 INQuIRY 331, 332-33 (2013) (explaining why it is much less
likely for low wage workers to have access to health insurance coverage).
87. See, e.g., Letter from Andrew Slavitt to Thomas Betlach, supra note 66, at 2-3 (stating
that, "[c]onsistent with Medicaid law, CMS reviews section 1115 demonstration applications
to determine whether they further the objectives of the program, such as by strengthening
coverage support for the objectives of the program. After reviewing Arizona's application to
determine whether it meets these standards, CMS is unable to approve the following requests,
which could undermine access to care and do not support the objectives of the program:
monthly contributions for beneficiaries in the new adult group with incomes up to and
including 100 percent of FPL; exclusion from coverage for a period of six months for
nonpayment of monthly premium contributions; a work requirement; fees for missed
appointments; additional verification requirements; and a time limit on coverage or health
outcomes for low-income individuals in the state or increasing access to providers"); Letter
from Marilyn Tavenner, Administrator, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Roderick
Bremby, Commissioner, Connecticut Dep't of Social Servs. 1 (Mar. 1, 2013) (denying
Connecticut's waiver request, finding that the proposal to impose an asset limit on very low-
income beneficiaries would not likely to assist in promoting the objectives of title XIX).
88. See, e.g., Newton-Nations v. Betlach, 660 F.3d 370, 381-82 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding
that " [t]here is little, if any, evidence that the Secretary considered the factors § 1315 requires
her to consider before granting Arizona's waiver. Thus, the Secretary's decision was arbitrary
and capricious within the meaning of the APA insofar as it "entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem"); and see Wood v. Betlach, 922 F. Supp. 2d 836, 851 (D.
Ariz. 2013) (finding that the Secretary's grant of Arizona's waiver request was arbitrary and
capricious where the Secretary failed to consider evidence that imposition of higher
copayments has resulted in beneficiaries relying on expensive emergency room care and
having untreated conditions leading ultimately to more serious and expensive illnesses, rather
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under the Obama administration refused to grant any waiver requesting
mandatory work requirements, on the ground that they did not promote the
purposes of Medicaid.89
Most of the States' current requests for waivers seeking to impose work
requirements on certain Medicaid beneficiaries purport to be permissible
based on a waiver of 42 USC § 1396a(a)(10)(A), which identifies mandatory
eligibility for Medicaid for particular populations.90 These waiver requests
typically refer to the adult ACA expansion population, and in some cases also
to parents of dependent children. 91 The requests suggest that states are
conceptualizing work requirements as an additional condition of eligibility,
and hence as a restriction. Courts have found it within the purview of the
Secretary to grant waiver requests that impose requirements that may restrict
eligibility or benefits.92 However, either the restriction itself, or the overall
demonstration project of which the restriction is a part, must further the
purposes of the Medicaid statute by, for example, allowing a state to continue
providing at least some coverage to an expansion population.93
than saving money that the state could then use to further Medicaid's purpose of providing
coverage to certain low-income populations).
89. See, e.g., Letter from Andrew Slavitt to Thomas Betlach, supra note 66, at 2-3 (stating
that CMS would be unable to approve a work requirement).
90. See 42 USC § 1396a(a)(10)(A); see, e.g., IND. FAMILY & SOCIAL SERVS. ADMIN.,
Healthy Indiana 2.0 Section 1115 Demonstration Amendment 25 (2017) [hereinafter, Health
Indiana Plan (HIP)]; Ky. CABINET FOR HEALTH & FAMILY SERVS., Kentucky Health Section
1115 Demonstration Application 12 (2017) [hereinafter, Kentucky Waiver Application];
MAINE DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., MaineCare 1115 Waiver Application 13 (2017).
91. See, e.g., Maine Waiver Application, supra note 73, at 13-14. (providing a table of
eligibility groups impacted by the proposed work requirements and premiums).
92. See, e.g., Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1104-05 (1973) (holding that "only
limitation imposed on the Secretary was that he must judge the project to be "likely to assist
in promoting the objectives" of the designated parts of the Social Security Act," and thus that
granting a waiver may, in the process, result in the curtailment or denial of services); Newton-
Nations, 660 F.3d at 380 (". . .[F]or the Secretary to act within her § 1315 authority, the
administrative record must demonstrate that she "examine[d] each of th[ree] issues." First,
whether the project is an "Experimental, Pilot or Demonstration Project." Second, whether the
project is "Likely To Assist in Promoting The Objectives Of The Act." Third, "the extent and
period" for which she finds the project is necessary") (internal citations omitted).
93. See, e.g., Newton-Nations, 660 F.3d at 380 (". .. [F]or the Secretary to act within her
§ 1315 authority, the administrative record must demonstrate that she "examine[d] each of
th[ree] issues." First, whether the project is an "Experimental, Pilot or Demonstration Project."
Second, whether the project is "Likely To Assist in Promoting The Objectives Of The Act."
Third, "the extent and period" for which she finds the project is necessary") (internal citations
omitted). Whether a demonstration project would fail this test because one portion of the
project, such as work requirements, fails it, is uncertain. The district court in Wood v. Betlach
held that it is the project as a whole that must pass the test, rather than each component of the
project. Wood v. Betlach, 2013 WL 3871414, at 5 (D. Ariz. 2013) ("The imposition of
copayments on the expansion population may be relevant or even central to the Secretary's
consideration of the experimental purpose of the demonstration project and of its overall
effectiveness in furthering the objectives of the Medicaid Act, but nothing in Newton Nations,
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In the case of work requirement requests, states with waiver applications
under consideration provide a variety of rationales for justification. None,
however, appear likely to satisfy Medicaid's goals on their own if given more
than a cursory examination. For example, Kentucky's waiver request
references "achievement of maximum independence" as a ground for
requiring certain individuals to work if they want to obtain or maintain
benefits.94 This "independence" rationale derives from language in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396-1, stating that Medicaid is meant, in part, to provide medical care and
rehabilitative services to help impoverished or disabled individuals attain or
maintain the ability to take care of themselves, rather than, for example,
becoming dependent on residential care. 5 However, there is no evidence that
this provision relates to a beneficiary's employment or financial
independence. Rather, it has to do with a beneficiary's ability to perform
activities of daily living and other such tasks.
In a similar vein, Kentucky's waiver request also quotes from a CMS
website, providing that "employment is a fundamental part of life for people
with and without disabilities" and is "essential to an individual's economic
self-sufficiency, self-esteem, and well-being.- 96 However, this quote is taken
out of context. Although the CMS webpage in question discusses
employment in relation to Medicaid, it does so in the context of describing
programs that help workers with disabilities who have earnings in excess of
those allowed under traditional Medicaid rules to obtain Medicaid
coverage.9  In other words, CMS describes an expansive and positive
approach to ensuring that disabled Medicaid beneficiaries can both remain
Beno, or the language of Section 1115 persuades the Court that compliance with Section 1115
must be found in the copayments alone rather than the demonstration project as a whole.").
The issue, however, has not yet been adjudicated in a published case, or in any higher forum.
94. See Kentucky Health Waiver Application, supra note 68 (stating that "meaningful
work and participating as a contributing member of society is.. .essential to individual's
economic self-sufficiency").
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1(a).
96. See Kentucky Waiver Application, supra note 90, at 12 (indicating that Kentucky
HEALTH's waiver requiring all able-bodied working age adult members without dependents
participate in the community engagement and employment initiatives to maintain enrollment
is based on the CMS's belief that "meaningful work and participating member of society is
recognized as part of a healthy lifestyle and 'essential to individual's [sic] economic self-
sufficiency, self-esteem and well-being"; see also Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,
Medicaid Employment Initiatives,
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/ltss/employmment/index.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2017)
[hereinafter Medicaid Employment Initiatives] (describing Medicaid employment initiatives,
and defining the importance of employment and meaningful work for disabled adult Medicaid
beneficiaries).
97. See Medicaid Employment Initiatives, supra note 96 ("Medicaid Buy-In program is
an optional State Medicaid benefit group for workers with disabilities who have earnings in
excess of traditional Medicaid rules ... Ideally, it means workers with disabilities do not need
to choose between healthcare and work.").
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employed and still receive the coverage they need,98 rather than a restrictive
and negative approach to limiting coverage by imposing work requirements
on non-disabled Medicaid beneficiaries as proposed by Arizona, Kentucky,
and other states. 99
Like that of Kentucky, Indiana's waiver application also cites a connection
between employment and superior health.00 Indiana bases its assertion on
two published articles, while at the same time admitting that at least some
conflicting findings exist regarding the connection between work and
health.0 Kentucky, for its part, bases its own claim on only one published
article.10 2  The first article cited in Indiana's waiver application,
Psychological and Physical Well-Being During Unemployment: A Meta-
Analytic Study, found "a negative effect" on mental health" following
involuntary job loss, notwithstanding the article's further finding that the
effects of unemployment on the formerly employed are "not
homogeneous.""1 3 The article arguably supports voluntary job training and
placement efforts for interested individuals, such as those currently in place
in Indiana and Montana. 104 However, factors such as financial worries and
98. Id. (indicating that the optional Medicaid Buy-In program "allows workers with
disabilities to have higher earnings and maintain their Medicaid coverage," thus covering
142,000 individuals under this new eligibility group throughout 42 states).
99. Kentucky Waiver Application, supra note 90, at 12; Az. HEALTH CARE COST
CONTAINMENT SYSTEM, Arizona Section 1115 Waiver Amendment Request: Senate Bill 1092
Arizona Legislative Directives, at 2,
https://azahcccs.gov/Resources/Downloads/ 1l5Waiver/SB 1092WaiverRequest0l 1017.pdf
(last visited Dec. 5, 2017).
100. See Healthy Indiana Plan (HIP), supra note 90, at 4 ("In general, employed
individuals are both physically and mentally healthier, as well as more financially stable, as
compared to unemployed individuals.").
101. Id. at 4-5. Footnote 1 cites two articles: Frances M. McKee-Ryan et al.,
Psychological and Physical Well-Being During Unemployment: A Meta-Analytic Study, 90 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 53 (2005) and Karsten I. Paul et al., Latent Deprivation Among People
Who Are Employed, Unemployed, or Out of the Labor Force, 143 J. PSYCHOL. 477 (2009).
102. See Kentucky Waiver Application, supra note 90, at 12 (citing Kenneth C.
Hergenrather et al., Employment as a Social Determinant of Health: A Systematic Review of
Longitudinal Studies Exploring the Relationship Between Employment Status and Physical
Health, 29 REHABILITATION RES. POL'Y & EDUC. 2 (2015) in footnote 23).
103. See Frances M. McKee-Ryan et al., Psychological and Physical Well-Being During
Unemployment: A Meta-Analytic Study, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 53, 66-67 (2005) (finding
that, while the results are suggestive of a negative causal impact of unemployment on mental
health, limitations in the design of the studies used make it "unrealistic" to come to such a
conclusion; moreover, while there is some evidence that re-employment is positively
correlated with improved mental health, "the positive effects of becoming reemployed may be
limited to those who regain satisfactory new jobs").
104. See In. Fam. Social Serv. Admin., Healthy Indiana Plan: Gateway to Work,
https://www.in.gov/fssa/hip/2466.htm (describing Gateway to Work as a "free, voluntary
program" that "that helps connect HIP members to Indiana's workforce training programs,
work search resources and potential employers. HIP members who are unemployed or working
less than 20 hours a week will be referred to available employment, work search and job
2018
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the centrality of work to an individual's identity appear to play a larger role
in the effect of unemployment on a person's well-being than the mere fact of
unemployment itself." 5 As such, the article provides questionable support for
a requirement that non-disabled, non-pregnant adults age 19-64 must work at
least 20 hours per week to obtain or retain Medicaid benefits.
The primary finding of the second article cited in Indiana's waiver
application, Latent Deprivation among People who Are Employed,
Unemployed, or Out of the Labor Force, is that deprivation of the
"unintended by-products" of work - identified as "time structure, social
contact, collective purpose, status, and activity" - was associated with
depression in each group of German nationals studied: the employed, the
unemployed, and those who are not in the workforce but are not seeking
work, such as students and home-based caregivers.106 Of these groups, the
employed were least likely to experience latent deprivation, and the
unemployed were the most likely to do so. 1 0 7 This article, although
concerning Germans rather than Americans, suggests that employment may
better provide certain non-economic mental health benefits than voluntary or
involuntary unemployment.l°8 As such, it could support a voluntary program
providing training and job search support for individuals to obtain
meaningful and satisfying employment. 0 9 However, it does not in itself
support a mandatory program.
Kentucky's waiver application cites only a single research study,
Employment as a Social Determinant of Health: A Systematic Review of
Longitudinal Studies Exploring the Relationship between Employment Status
training programs that will assist them in securing new or potentially better employment");
see also Eric Whitney, Montana May Be Modelfor Future Medicaid Work Requirement, NPR
(Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/12/23/506121944/montana-
may-be-model-for-future-medicaid-work-requirement (discussing Montana's voluntary job
training program for the state's Medicaid expansion population).
105. McKee-Ryan et al., supra note 101, at 63, 64 (finding that "[u]nemployed
individuals' work-role centrality had significant negative relationships with their mental
health ... and life satisfaction ... , respectively," and that "perceived financial strain was
associated with lower mental health and life satisfaction").
106. Karsten I. Paul et al., Latent Deprivation Among People Who Are Employed,
Unemployed, or Out of the Labor Force, 143 J. PSYCHOL. 477, 487 (2009).
107. Id. at 483.
108. See id. at 486-87 (presenting results found using a sample of educated German
population that correlate latent functions to mental health among all people in modern society
and recognizing the limitations of results' generalizability).
109. See, e.g., Gayle Hamilton, Improving Employment and Earnings for TANF
Recipients, URB. INST. 1, 3 (2012),
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/2539 1/412566-Improving-Employment-
and-Eamings-for-TANF-Recipients.pdf (finding that a "mixed approach" program of job
training and search support that encouraged individuals to find better-quality jobs with
earnings above minimum wage, benefits, and opportunities for advancement worked better
than either a pure training and education or job-search-first focus).
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and Physical Health, in support of its work requirement request.110 This
article analyzed the results of studies across seven countries, and found a
consistent association between employment and better health, as well as
between unemployment and worse health.1 These findings are relatively
uncontroversial,1 2 and appear, at first glance, to support Kentucky's request.
However, as the authors of the study themselves observe, the nature of the
relationship between work, unemployment, and health is far from clear. 3
The studies that the authors analyzed all found associations between
employment and better health. 4 However, they did not find that work,
including menial or poorly paid work, causes better health - the finding that
Kentucky's waiver application needs in order for the study to support its work
request.1 1 5 It may be just as likely that better health increases the chance that
a person can be gainfully employed - a finding which would suggest
Kentucky should continue making Medicaid available to all low-income,
adult Kentuckians, including the unemployed. 6
110. See Kentucky Waiver Application, supra note 90, at 12 (citing Kenneth C.
Hergenrather et al., Employment as a Social Determinant of health: A Systematic Review of
Longitudinal Studies Exploring the Relationship Between Employment Status and Physical
Health, 29 REHABILITATION RES. POL'Y & EDUC. 2 (2015).
111. See generally Kenneth C. Hergenrather et al., Employment as a Social Determinant
of Health: A Systematic Review of Longitudinal Studies Exploring the Relationship between
Employment Status and Physical Health, 29 REHAB. RES., POL'Y, & EDUC. 2 (2015)
(concluding from its study that "employed persons and reemployed persons present better
physical health, whereas unemployed persons and persons who experience job loss present
poorer physical health").
112. See David Dooley, Jonathan Fielding, & Lennart Levi, Health and Unemployment,
ANNUAL REv. PUB. HEALTH 449, 454 (1996) ("Most evidence supports the generally assumed
negative effects of unemployment on physical and mental health and well-being.").
113. See Hergenrather et al., supra note 111, at 13 (revealing variations of effects between
full-time and part-time employment on specific sub-groups of people (e.g., women, men with
HIV).
114. Id.
115. Indeed, Hergenrather and colleagues note that "The association between
employment and physical health was significant with status (e.g., overemployed,
underemployed, part-time, temporary). Persons who were overemployed (i.e., working more
than 45 hr per week) reported more chronic disease (i.e., number of chronic conditions
reported during the past year) than persons employed full-time (e.g., working 35-45 hr per
week). Underemployed (i.e., low-wage job, low-status job) persons reported poorer functional
health (i.e., degree to which health or health-related problems interfered with daily activities)
and more chronic disease than those adequately employed. Persons employed part-time,
compared to persons employed full-time, reported decreased perceived health." Hergenrather
et al., supra note 111, at 13 (internal citations omitted).
116. Data suggest that this in fact may be correct. See, e.g., JACK HADLEY, SICKER AND
POORER: THE CONSEQUENCES OF BEING UNINSURED, 83 (2002) ("Poor health appears to reduce
work and income, as long as the effects of high income and wealth on the early retirement of
the healthy do not dominate.... Controlling for prior health, poor current health is strongly
associated with both labor force exit in general and application for disability insurance
benefits.").
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Maine's application, unlike the others, makes little attempt to link
employment and health.1 1 7 Instead it claims that
[e]mployment provides not only monetary compensation, but also daily
structure and a sense of pride that no government program can replicate.
For these reasons, and in alignment with other social service programs in
our state, DHHS intends to institute a community engagement and work
requirement for able-bodied adults in MaineCare similar to the
requirements DHHS implemented in the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) program in 2014.118
As such, the application makes essentially no attempt to contextualize the
work requirement within any arguable objective of Medicaid. Instead,
Maine's goal, in the waiver's own language, is "to increase employment and
wage earnings of able-bodied adults, while subsequently focusing MaineCare
funding on Maine's most needy individuals." '119 It is difficult to see how this
rationale fits within Medicaid's objective to provide access to medical care
for certain impoverished populations. 120 However, Maine's stated rationale
for the work request is arguably more honest about the state's intent than that
of Kentucky and Indiana. It clearly aligns requirements for Medicaid
eligibility with those for welfare programs such as SNAP and TANF. 121 In so
117. See Maine Waiver Application, supra note 73, at 5.
118. Id.
119. Id.; Maine's request also cites a state-produced 2016 study of Maine TANF
recipients who left to program due to time limits in the second quarter of 2012. The study
found that the 64% of TANF leavers with an employment record in at least one quarter
between the second quarter of 2011 and the first quarter of 2016 experienced an increase in
average wages, from $1,884/quarter ($628/month) in 2011-2012 to $3,459/quarter
($1,153/month) in 2015-2016. Governor's Office of Policy and Management, Wage and
Employment Outcomes for TANF Participants Closed for Time Limits 6 (May 25, 2017),
http://www.maine.gov/economist/docs/TANF%20Report%20Final%205-25-17.pdf. The
average wage of the former TANF recipients with a wage history who were timed out of the
program, in other words, was less than the federal poverty level for a family of two in 2016.
Thirty-six percent of the timed-out former TANF recipients had no wage history at all during
the relevant period. Id. The report speculated that these individuals may in fact have been
employed, but not in positions that were included in the state Unemployment Insurance dataset
used in performing the study. Id. at 12. If they were employed, they were self-employed,
federally employed, working under the table, or had left the state. They may, of course, instead
have been unemployed; see, e.g., JEFFREY GROGGER & LYNN A. KAROLY, WELFARE REFORM:
EFFECTS OF A DECADE OF CHANGE 135 (2005) ("One problem with administrative data is that
they miss people who move between states. Each state maintains its own earnings files, so
when a worker moves out of state, her earnings record in the home state shows zero earnings.
But earnings records also show zero earnings when a worker becomes jobless, and it is not
possible to distinguish this status from those who have moved.").
120. See CMS, MEDICAID & CHIP STRENGTHENING COVERAGE IMPROVING HEALTH 4
(2017) (providing that Medicaid, along with CHIP, are the "cornerstone of health coverage for
low-income children, parents and other adults, individuals with disabilities, and seniors").
121. See generally DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE TO
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doing, Maine's application seeks to make Medicaid more closely resemble
traditional welfare, including the stigma that can accompany such
programs. 122
III. PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS: THE TANF EXPERIENCE
Setting aside the questionable legality of the applications, it nevertheless
appears likely that HHS will grant one or more of the pending Medicaid
waiver requests seeking welfare-style reforms. 123 The question then arises:
what may be the effects of personal responsibility requirements, such as work
requirements and time limits, on Medicaid beneficiaries? Some scholars of
Medicaid policy have concluded, based on general outcomes from TANF and
other welfare programs, that such requirements would disincentivize
beneficiaries from applying for or maintaining coverage.124 However, the
impact of such requirements turns out to be a more complicated issue.
A. Time Limits and Work Requirements: The Problems of Inconsistent
Policy and Application
Studies of TANF requirements have revealed some useful findings. First,
cash welfare reform was associated with a significant caseload decline that
persisted throughout two recessions, even while participation in other
assistance programs, like unemployment and SNAP, increased. 125
Additionally, in many states, time limit restrictions have a negative impact
on welfare use, at least in the case of families with very young children who
may need to ration cash welfare use over time, given that in many cases they
have, at most, five of the first eighteen years of their youngest child's life in
which to use it.126 Finally, the existence of alternative, supporting programs
NEEDY FAMILIES PROGRAM, 11TH REPORT TO CONGRESS v (2016) (requiring individuals to
participate in federally listed work activities to access TANF financial assistance); See also
Letter from Adam Mejer, Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy, to Brian Neal, Director, Center for
Medicaid and CHIP Services, Kentucky HEALTH §1115 Demonstration Modification Request
3 (July 3, 2017), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Waivers/l 15/downloads/ky/ky-health-pa2.pdf (citing this as a reason for an
amendment to its waiver application).
122. For a discussion of stigma associated with personal responsibility requirements, see
infra, notes 191-192 and associated text.
123. Letter from Thomas E. Price and Seema Verma to Governors of the United States,
supra note 13, at 1.
124. See supra, notes 15, 16 and associated text.
125. See Gregory Acs & Pamela Loprest, TANF Caseload Composition and Leavers
Synthesis Report 21 (2007) (finding that "[t]he [TANF] caseload fell by half between 1996
and 2000 and has continued to fall at a slower rate since, from 2.3 million families in 2000 to
1.9 million in the first part of 2006").
126. See Jeffrey Grogger, The Effects of Time Limits, The EITC, and Other Policy
Changes on Welfare Use, Work, and IncomeAmong Female-Headed Families, 85 REv. ECON.
& STAT. 394, 404 (2003) [hereinafter The Effects of Time Limits] (concluding that time limits
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such as the expanded EITC, Medicaid, and SNAP, in conjunction with
periods of economic expansion, make work a viable alternative for many
families who might otherwise seek cash welfare for support.
12
Before moving on, the issue of time limits requires more attention. At least
one study has found that the percentage of families actually timed out of
TANF is very small, on average usually accounting for fewer than five
percent of those leaving TANF every month. 128 There are several reasons for
this. First, nearly half of TANF cases nationwide involve children only, and
child-only cases are not subject to time limits. 129 Second, slightly less than
half of states have a hard time limit, and most others permit access to some
form of TANF-style benefits even after a time limit is reached.130 Third,
nearly all states allow exceptions to TANF time limits.131 Finally, time limits,
as mentioned above, are correlated with discrepancies between how families
with younger children and families with older children use TANF.
13 2
Families with very young children appear to ration their use of TANF more
carefully.133 The rationing effect of time limits appears significantly less
pronounced in families with only older dependent children, who are unlikely
to exhaust their time limits before their children reach the age of majority. 34
Projecting the likely effects of TANF-style reforms in Medicaid is
difficult. Not only are data on the impacts of specific TANF interventions
often difficult to compare, but also the differing purposes of TANF and
have the greatest effects on families with the youngest children).
127. See NORMA B. COE ET AL., THE URBAN INST., NEW FEDERALISM ISSUES & OPTIONS
FOR STATES, DOES WORK PAY? A SUMMARY OF THE WORK INCENTrVES UNDER TANF4 (1998),
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/66636/308019-Does-Work-Pay-A-
Summary-of-the-Work-Incentives-under-TANF.pdf (noting that TANF, food stamps, EITC,
and other forms of assistance have the "potential to greatly affect the well-being of a family
shifting from welfare to work"); see also The Effects of Time Limits, supra note 126, at 408
(concluding that EITC had substantial effects in behavior and may be the "single most
important policy measure for explaining the decrease in welfare and the rise in work and
earnings").
128. Mary Farrell et al., Welfare Time Limits: An Update on State Policies,
Implementation, and Effects on Families, DEP'T OFHEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 1, 34,43 (2008).
129. Id. at 50.
130. Id. at 7-10.
131. Id. at 10-12.
132. The Effects of Time Limits, supra note 126, at 394, 400 ("[E]ligibility for aid under
TANF... ends when the youngest child in the family turns 18. Thus, families with younger
youngest children have longer eligibility horizons than families with older youngest
children"); Jeffrey Grogger & Charles Michalopolous, Welfare Dynamics Under Time Limits,
111 J. POL. ECON. 530, 545, 550-51 (2003).
133. The Effects of Time Limits, supra note 126, at 400; Grogger & Michalopolous, supra
note 132, at 545, 550-51.
134. See Grogger & Michalopolous, supra note 132, at 551 ("Whereas families with older
youngest children have relatively little chance of prematurely exhausting their benefits ...
This prediction is largely borne out by our empirical results").
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Medicaid and the different needs of their clientele make comparisons
problematic.135 Take the issue of time limits on access to TANF versus
Medicaid. TANF is only available to families with children under the age of
eighteen, whereas Medicaid is available to people in all stages of life. 136
Unless a person is elderly, disabled, or has one or more chronic conditions,
he is unlikely to know whether or when he will need Medicaid. This
represents the central risk to the uninsured; the need for insurance is
unpredictable, and when a pressing need arises, it may be too late or
impossible to obtain it if there is a time limit to coverage and if one has
exhausted it.13 Imposing a five-year limit on Medicaid coverage of non-
elderly, non-disabled adults will almost certainly encourage individuals to go
bare rather than prudently obtaining coverage prior to needing it.138 Time
restrictions, combined with the unpredictability of needed care, thus
encourage potential beneficiaries to refrain from obtaining necessary medical
care until they have an emergency or are too sick to forgo treatment.139 Time
limits would accordingly threaten to undo recent gains in the health status of
formerly uninsured Medicaid beneficiaries who obtained coverage courtesy
of their state's expansion under the ACA.14 ° They also arguably work at
cross-purposes with states that are seeking to obtain, or have obtained,
waivers of retroactive and presumptive eligibility on the theory that
eliminating this standard feature of Medicaid encourages prudent and
responsible enrollment on the part of Medicaid applicants.141
135. See e.g., GROGGER & KAROLY, supra note 119, at 59-71 (detailing methodological
problems with, and potential strategies for, estimating causal effects of specific welfare reform
provisions).
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10)(A) (2016) (enumerating a number of populations
covered by Medicaid, ranging from children to the elderly).
137. See Steven D. Pizer et al., Uninsured Adults with Chronic Conditions or Disabilities:
Gaps in Public Insurance Programs, 28 HEALTH. AFF. wi 141, wi 145 (2009) (suggesting that
lower uninsurance rates among people with disabilities or health conditions reflected the
greater importance of health insurance to them relative to those who had neither a disability
nor a health condition); see also Andrew P. Wilper et al., Health Insurance and Mortality in
US Adults, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2289, 2294 (2009) (showing an increased risk of death
attributed to lack of insurance).
138. Pizer, supra note 137; see Wilper, supra note 137 (loss of government-sponsored
insurance was associated with decreased use of physician services).
139. Wilper, supra note 137, at 2293.
140. See e.g. Sharon K. Long et al., Sustained Gains in Coverage, Access, and
Affordability under the ACA: A 2017 Update, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1656, 1658-59 (2017) (finding
increased access to Medicaid to be the "driving force" in insurance gains since 2013, a
significant decline in self-reported unmet need for health services, and significant
improvement in health care affordability).
141. See e.g. IowA DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., Section 1115 Demonstration Amendment:
Iowa Wellness Plan (June 27, 2017),
https://dhs.iowa.gov/sites/default/files/owaWaiver of Retroactivity-Draft_ 6.22.17.pdf
("[T]he State seeks to more closely align Medicaid policy with that of the commercial market,
2018
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Once we get beyond time limits, variations in implementation of TANF
policies complicate any projection of parallel policies on Medicaid.142 To
start, there have been wide discrepancies in TANF's role as a safety net from
state to state.143 For example, the effect of the Great Recession of 2007-2009
yielded substantially different effects on states' TANF caseloads.1" In New
Mexico, the TANF caseload increased roughly in tandem with the rise in the
unemployment rate.145 New Mexico had a sixty-month TANF time limit and
high rates of other public benefits in conjunction with cash welfare. 146 By
contrast, North Carolina's TANF caseload remained largely static while the
unemployment rate rose sharply. a1 4 North Carolina imposed a twenty four-
month time limit, after which participants became ineligible for the
subsequent thirty six months.148 Indeed, many states' TANF caseload
trajectories differed markedly during the Great Recession. 149 A study by the
Center for Budget and Policy Priorities found little overlap between states
with the greatest rise in unemployment rates and states with the greatest
increase in TANF caseloads. 15 Moreover, states facing similar increases in
unemployment sometimes had widely disparate changes in their TANF
caseloads. 151 For example, although Utah and Arizona saw similar increases
in their unemployment rates, 188% and 174% respectively, Utah's TANF
which does not allow for an individual to apply for retroactive health insurance coverage.
Eliminating Medicaid retroactivity encourages individuals to obtain and maintain health
insurance coverage, even when healthy").
142. See Ron Haskins et al., The Responsiveness of the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families Program During the Great Recession, BROOKINGS INST. (2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/responsiveness-tanf-great-recession
_haskins.pdf (recognizing a complex interaction between social and political influences that
cause the discrepancies between states).
143. See id. (examining the responsiveness of the TANF program to economic changes
and its variations across states).
144. See id. (recognizing the difference in the extent TANF caseload rose and fell
between states with regards to the recession).
145. Id. at 16.
146. See NEW MEXICO HUMAN SERVS. DEP'T, New Mexico's Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) State Plan: Jan. 1, 2015 Dec. 31, 2017, 37 (2015) (proposing new
plan for New Mexico, allowing for 60 months of TANF and $200 monthly fixed bonus for
eligible benefit groups); see also Haskins et al., supra note 142, at 43 (indicating that New
Mexico was one of the states that implemented changes to attempt to reduce TANF caseload).
147. Haskins et al., supra note 142, at 16.
148. Work First, N.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. (last updated Apr. 19, 2017),
https://www2.ncdhhs.gov/ DSS/workfirst/index.htm.
149. Haskins et al., supra note 142, at 12.
150. LaDonna Pavetti et al., TANF Emergingfrom the Downturn a Weaker Safety Net,
CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES 7 (2013),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-1-13tanf.pdf [hereinafter, TANF
Emerging from the Downturn].
151. Id.
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population increased by 45%, while Arizona's increased by only 6%. 152
These discrepancies reflect states' extensive latitude in shaping TANF
programs and allocating TANF spending.153 When TANF was enacted in
1996, Congress set federal funding at approximately $16.6 billion per year,
without any provision to increase the amount to take inflation or other matters
into account. 154 States are required to expend, using state or local dollars, at
least seventy-five percent of what they were spending on the program in
fiscal year 1994 as a condition of receiving the federal block grant. 155 In
exchange, the federal government gives states substantial flexibility to use
their grant as they choose. 156 The law provides that states may use their grants
"in any manner that is reasonably calculated to accomplish the purpose of
[TANF], including to provide low income households with assistance in
meeting home heating and cooling costs," or in any way it was permitted to
use the funds under the old AFDC program. 15' Even where states must
comply with federal requirements, those requirements are flexible. 158 For
example, federal law requires states to certify, as a condition of receiving
their TANF block grant, that at least fifty percent of their TANF families with
at least one adult member are engaged in countable work activities.
15 9
However, there are a variety of ways that a state can meet or obtain
exceptions from this participation requirement, and hence most states have
TANF work participation rates that have been far less than fifty percent over
the life of the program.
160
152. Id. These rates of unemployment growth reflect the period from the start of the Great
Recession to the rates' respective peaks.
153. Id. at 9.
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(1)(c) (2017) (lacking any provision regarding adjustment for
inflation); see also DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE TO NEEDY
FAMILIES PROGRAM, 11TH REPORT TO CONGRESS 94-95 (2016) (calculating that the average
grant value from 1996 to 2013, adjusted for inflation, declined by 26%).
155. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TEMPORARY AID TO NEEDY FAMILIES
PROGRAM, 9TH REPORT TO CONGRESS 25 (2016); 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(5)(iv)() (2017) (outlining
the mandatory provisions, including the minimum spending, to continue to receive federal
block grants for TANF).
156. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 601(a) (2017); see also Liz Schott et al., How States Use Federal
and State Funds Under the TANF Block Grant, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES 1 (2015),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/4-8-15tanf O.pdf (presenting key
argument for block granting was that states needed much greater flexibility over the use of the
federal funds than AFDC's funding structure provided).
157. 42 U.S.C.A. § 604(a) (2017).
158. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 34, at 3.
159. 42 U.S.C.S § 607 (2017) (exploring "block grants to states for temporary assistance
for needy families").
160. Id.; see also Gene Falk, Temporary Aid to Needy Families: The Work Participation
Standard and Engagement in WelWare-to-Work Activities, CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV. 19-20
(2017), http://www.aphsa.org/content/dam/NASTA/PDF/CRS-RPTR44751 _2017-02-
01.pdf (identifying multiple routes for states to meet the work participation standard and
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As a consequence of this sort of flexibility, TANF policies differ widely
from state to state.161 Two such differences are TANF eligibility and access
to cash benefits. In 2010, California families earning nearly eighty percent of
the federal poverty level could qualify for TANF benefits and access the
state's comparatively generous cash benefits. 162 Meanwhile, Texas families
earning more than twenty-six percent of the federal poverty level no longer
qualified for cash benefits. 163 Furthermore, Texas TANF benefits paled in
comparison to California's; the average TANF benefit for a Texas family of
three could not cover the state's average fair market rent for a one-bedroom
apartment, and only ten percent of the state's TANF funds went to cover cash
benefits for TANF recipients.
164
B. Disambiguating the Effects of TANF Policies from Other Factors
State TANF policy choices are also affected by a variety of factors,
including state and federal public benefit programs, economic policies, social
policies, and tax policies.165 State policies regarding the effects of federal
work requirements and time limits have functioned in conjunction with a
variety of federal and state policy choices, such as the EITC, availability of
Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"), imposition of family caps, and state
decisions on percentages of TANF funding to allocate to certain programs
(e.g. cash assistance versus parenting training, child care, prekindergarten
programs, and others).166 This helps explain the disparate results discussed
above regarding the experience of TANF populations in New Mexico versus
North Carolina during the Great Recession. 167 Because North Carolina had a
weaker TANF safety net than New Mexico, more low-income North Carolina
residents turned to other means of public and private support than did New
Mexicans. 168 North Carolina residents who could find a job and supplement
their earnings through the EITC, or who could qualify for SSI benefits,
pursued these alternatives. 169 Indeed, as TANF programs shrunk and
otherwise became more difficult to access, more people obtained the EITC
providing illustrations of state participation).
161. Heather Hahn et al., State Approaches to the TANF Block Grant: Welfare is Not
What You Think it is, THE URB. INST. 9-22 (2012),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/2573 1/412635-State-Approaches-to-
the-TANF-Block-Grant-Welfare-Is-Not-What-You-Think-It-s.pdf.
162. Id. at 11-13.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 12, 24.
165. Id. at 23-29.
166. Id.
167. Haskins et al., supra note 142, at 12-20.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 32-33; Work First, supra note 148 and associated text.
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or SSI benefits.10
If we want to determine with any precision what effect work or another
personal responsibility requirement had on TANF caseloads, it becomes
difficult to disentangle the effects of these requirements from other
requirements, state resource allocation decisions, and other relevant
circumstances. This is the case, even years after implementation of
PRWORA and alterations to it under the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005.1
As one researcher noted,
[p]ost-1996, it is much more difficult to characterize the policy
environment for each state. State welfare policies vary along multiple
program dimensions, and the precise nature of the bundle matters since
different program components may interact with each other. For instance,
one may need to control for the interaction of [benefit reduction rates] and
sanctions, rather than just controlling for each separately. Not all of the
program elements described above are easily coded, and there is little
guidance in the research to date showing the most effective way to measure
and code some of the newer policies like time limits, sanctions or diversion
activities. In some cases only a few states have adopted particular policies
or combinations of policies. For data sets with state level observations, this
can make it difficult to estimate precise policy effects.
1 72
While the excerpt cited here is from a 2002 article, researchers working more
recently still confront similar problems. 
1 3
170. See, e.g., Jeffrey Grogger, The Effect of Time Limits, the EITC, and Other Policy
Changes on Welfare Use, Work, and Income Among Female-Headed Families, 85 REv. ECON.
& STATISTICS 394, 405-07 (2003) (finding that the EITC accounted for thirty-seven percent of
the increase in employment of female heads of households between 1992 and 1996, and that
most of the effect of the EITC on non-working welfare recipients was to move them off of
welfare and into the workforce); Steve Wamhoff & Michael Wiseman, The TANFISSI
Connection, 66 Soc. SECURITY BULL. (2005/2006), https:/!perma.cc/VZ96-Y8BT (finding that
"the incidence of SSI awards among TANF recipients has been much greater [in the early
2000s] than it was during the early 1990s ... Award rates for children rose from an average
of 0.92 per month per 1,000 child TANF recipients in 1991-1993 to 1.28 per 1,000 in 2001-
2003. The change was even more dramatic for adults. On average in each month of 1991-
1993, 1.55 TANF-linked SSI awards were made per 1,000 recipients. By 2001-2003, the
average rate was slightly over 4 per 1,000 per month. Although the number of SSI awards
associated with welfare went down between 1991-1993 and 2001-2003 by 42 percent for
children and 25 percent for adults, the caseload fell substantially more, so incidence rose").
171. Wamhoff& Wiseman, supra note 170.
172. Rebecca M. Blank, Evaluating Welfare Reform in the United States, 40 J. ECON. LIT.
1105, 1120 (2002).
173. See generally, GROGGER & KAROLY, supra note 119, at 248-52 (detailing gaps in
our knowledge about welfare reform, emphasizing in particular deficiencies in long-term data,
the relationship between the economy and welfare reform outcomes, and variability in
researchers' characterizations of state policy choices); Elizabeth Lower-Basch & Mark K.
Greenberg, Single Mothers in the Era of Welfare Reform, in THE GLOVES-OFF ECONOMY:
WORKPLACE STANDARDS AT THE BOTTOM OF AMERICA'S LABOR MARKET (A. Bernhardt, H.
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While differentiating between the effects of work requirements, time
limits, and other personal responsibility requirements on TANF utilization is
difficult, extrapolating these effects to the Medicaid program can become
speculative. 174 Consider work requirements. In a meta-analysis of
experimental and observational studies in the first ten years of TANF, Jeffrey
Grogger and Lynn A. Karoly found that work requirements in TANF were
clearly associated with reduced cash welfare use and payments. 175 However,
many of the studies Grogger and Karoly examined were performed during
periods of economic expansion. 176 As such, it is left to speculation as to how
many of these people would have started working and left welfare even
without such requirements. 177 One is thus left to wonder: to what extent did
the work requirement function simply as a "nudge" to encourage people to
leave welfare or to work more and reduce their benefits? Did the work
requirement actually help induce those who would have taken up or remained
on welfare to become employed in a job that allowed them to become self-
sufficient, or did something else happen to them? 17 ' Did those who took up
work end up better off financially than they had been while on welfare, or
were their financial circumstances relatively unchanged or even made
worse? 179 Given especially that we know that TANF take-up became weaker
Boushey, L. Dresser, and C. Tilly, eds. 2009) (discussing gaps in researchers' knowledge of
the effects of different state policies and conditions on work-related issues in welfare reform);
Richard C. Fording et al., Devolution, Discretion, and the Effect of Local Political Values on
TANF Sanctioning, 81 Soc. SERV. REv. 285, 285 (2007); LADONNA PAVETTI ET AL., REVIEW
OF SANCTION POLICIES AND RESEARCH STUDIES 7 (2003) [hereinafter, Review of Sanction
Policies and Research Studies], https://perma.cc/7BM3-FRPE.
174. Julia Paradise & Rachel Garfield, What is Medicaid's Impact on Access to Care,
Health Outcomes, and Quality of Care? Setting the Record Straight on the Evidence, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 2, 2013), https://www.kff.org/report-section/what-is-medicaids-impact-
on-access-to-care-health-outcomes-and-quality-of-care-setting-the-record-straight-on-the-
evidence-issue-brief! (last visited Dec. 5, 2017) (noting that researchers commonly cite as a
limitation of their studies the possibility that they did not fully control for underlying
population differences that might help to explain their findings).
175. See, e.g., GROGGER & KAROLY, supra note 119, at 110-11 (finding that "all but one
of the thirteen programs that imposed mandatory work or related activities significantly
decreased welfare use," with an average reduction in use of 5.1%).
176. Id. at 76-82, 98-101 (summarizing and citing the random assignment and
observational studies used in tabular form, including the random assignment or sample period
for each); U.S. Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RES.
(2012) https://perma.cc/3QDK-UC38.
177. GROGGER & KAROLY, supra note 119; see, e.g., Gregory Acs & Pamela Loprest,
Final Report: TANF Caseload Composition and Leavers Synthesis Report, 75-78 (2007)
(demonstrating that, to date, the employment rate for TANF heads of families who leave the
program has declined, and the earnings of TANF leavers appear to have leveled off).
178. See, e.g., Farrell et al., supra note 128.
179. GROGGER & KAROLY, supra note 119, at 235 (Grogger and Karoly found in a 2005
meta-analysis that the effect of mandatory work requirements on income was ambiguous: they
noted that, of fourteen studies, six reported a negative effect on income and eight a positive
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while poverty rates increased during the last recession, can we really
conclude that work requirements have "succeeded," merely because of their
association with decreased take-up of cash welfare?180
C. The Indirect Effects of Hassle and Stigma
Any such conclusion would be incomplete without also considering
additional issues, such as "hassle factor" and the role of stigma on TANF
utilization.181 While the application of policies such as work requirements to
any means-tested program involves hassle, some states take additional steps
to make it more difficult to apply for and remain enrolled in these programs
in an attempt to reduce their caseload. 82 Such strategies include requiring an
in-person "workforce orientation," requiring applicants to work a certain
number of hours prior to receiving any assistance, requiring drug tests, or
even simply advertising that the program carries such requirements and
encouraging applicants to consider pursuing any other option before applying
for the program in question. 83
effect. The magnitude of the changes was small, and many of the findings were statistically
insignificant. They conclude that "on average, the gain in earnings just offsets the loss in
welfare payments, leaving income roughly unchanged.").
180. Falk, supra note 160, at 13.
181. The "hassle factor" is a well-recognized phenomenon in means-tested programs and
is typically used to discourage individuals from seeking or obtaining assistance. See, e.g.,
Marilyn Ellwood, The Medicaid Eligibility Maze: Coverage Expands, but Enrollment
Problems Persist Findings from a Five-State Study, THE URB. INST., 1, 21 (1999) ("A senior
Florida official suggested that once some families understand how Medicaid works and the
hassle that is involved, they slip into pursuing coverage episodically, only bothering with all
the paperwork if a child is sick or otherwise needs care"); David Ribar, Marilyn Edelhoch, &
Quiduan Liu, Watching the Clocks: The Role of Food Stamp Certification and TANF Time
Limits in Caseload Dynamics, THE J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES, 1, 6 (2005) ("The time required
for face-to-face interviews and the paperwork hassles associated with even the mail-in
procedure may have deterred participation, especially among working families who, in
addition to facing frequent recertifications, also have less time because of their jobs"); Pamela
Loprest, Stefanie, Schmidt, & Ann Dryden Witte, Welare Reform under PRWORA: Aid to
Children with Working Families? 14 TAX POL'Y & THE EcONOMY157, 192 (James M. Poterba,
ed. 2000) ("The second most common reason for leaving, reported by 10 percent of leavers,
was administrative problems or hassles.").
182. Richard C. Fording, Joe Soss, & Sanford F. Schram, Devolution, Discretion, and
the Effect of Local Political Values on TANF Sanctioning, 81 SOCIAL SERV. REv. 285, 289-91
(2007); Review of Sanction Policies and Research Studies, supra note 173, at 7 ("To date, no
systematic data has been collected on how sanctions are being implemented, probably because
many of the key decisions are left to local offices, making it to difficult to collect this
information in a cost-effective manner. There may be considerable variation from office to
office, and possibly from one worker to another within the same office. Factors that might
influence the implementation of sanctions include the "culture" of the welfare office,
especially the strategies used to communicate the importance of work and to encourage
compliance, staff workloads and the complexity of the service delivery system.").
183. See, e.g., Texas Works Handbook, A-2200: Workforce Orientation,
https://perma.cc/KVA9-BTW8; Maggie McCarty et al., Drug Testing and Crime-Related
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This hassle factor unfolds at the local level and causes tracking problems
of its own.18 4 Devolution allows for far greater county-level or other local
control, and this has certainly played out in TANF.8 5 For example, one study
by Richard Fording, Joe Soss, and Sanford Schram looked at the use of
sanctions in TANF cases county by county in Florida.1 16 Fording and his
colleagues chose to study Florida because of the state's formal transfer of
authority over its welfare programs and policies to local agencies, and
because of the substantial policy variation between the different agencies. 
18 7
The study found a relationship between local political conservatism and
sanction use in TANF cases, with sanction use rising as the level of
conservatism in the county increases. 8 8 Correspondingly, the study found
that families were more likely to be able to stay on TANF longer in liberal
Florida counties than in conservative ones. 8 9 As more control over Medicaid
devolves onto states and possibly onto more local units of government,
depending on what happens with ACA Marketplaces, one may see a similar
pattern of this kind in some Medicaid programs.190 It is not unreasonable to
predict that these strategies may be used in at least some of the Medicaid
waiver programs presently under consideration.
Another issue - one that, like the "hassle factor," makes welfare
enrollment and continuation less attractive - is stigma. The personal
responsibility requirements discussed above assume that those who need
benefits do so because they cannot take care of themselves, and that this
inability, if not due to minority, age, or disability, is instead due to a failure
to take proper responsibility for their lives.191 Proponents of such
requirements deliberately intend them to help teach the poor how to live.192
It is one thing for a clerk at a grocery store to scoff at someone using an EBT
card to buy her groceries, but it is arguably quite another if one's health care
Restrictions in TANF, SNAP, and Housing Assistance, CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV., 1, 7-10
(2016).
184. See Ellwood supra, note 181.
185. See, e.g., Fording et al., supra note 173, at 285-87.
186. Id. at 285.
187. Id. at 293-94.
188. Id. at 285-312.
189. Id. at 307-09.
190. Id.
191. See Lawrence M. Mead, The Rise of Paternalism, in The NEW PATERNALISM:
SUPERVISORY APPROACHES TO POVERTY, 19-20 (Lawrence M. Mead, ed. 1997); see also
Casey Ross, Trump Health Official Seema Verma Has a Plan to Slash Medicaid Rolls. Here's
How, STAT NEWs (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/10/26/seema-verma-
medicaid-plan/ (discussing the Trump administration's goal of moving "able-bodied"
Medicaid beneficiaries off of public coverage).
192. See, e.g., LAWRENCE MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP 10, 196-206, 246-48 (1986).
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provider does so, due to increased stigmatization of Medicaid.
Stigmatization of Medicaid recipients within the health care community
would be an especially bad result, given that Medicaid beneficiaries may
already be disproportionately likely to experience discrimination by health
care providers due to their race. First, physicians and other health care
providers are just as likely to hold biases against particular groups as the
population at large,193 and substantial evidence exists that racial disparities in
health outcomes may be caused, at least in part, by racial stereotyping and
discrimination.194 Medicaid beneficiaries are disproportionately likely to be
a member of a racial minority. 19 5 Disparate treatment is an affront to patient
dignity, can negatively impact outcomes for patients, and constitutes a poor
use of public resources. 1 6
Medicaid stigma does not derive from any explicit legislative intent, and
no part of the Medicaid statute suggests that Congress intended the program
to provide substandard care.19 The statue does not have language suggesting
that Congress intended Medicaid, like TANF, to "end the dependence of
needy families on government benefits." '198 On the contrary, the language in
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) suggests that Medicaid payments are supposed
to be "consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care" and
sufficient to make access and receipt of care analogous to that of the general
population in that area.1 99 Regardless of Medicaid's long history of poor
provider payment in most states,200 Congress did not build substandard
payments for poor-quality care into the statute.
Additionally, while Medicaid has historically been linked with and carried
the stigma of cash welfare, Congress and federal agencies have endeavored
over time to relieve Medicaid from its association to welfare.201 This has not
been a steady process, and there have been a number of significant retreats at
193. Dayna B. Matthew, Health Care, Title VI, and Racism's New Normal, 6 GEo. J. L.
& MOD. CRIT. RACE PERSP. 3, 20 (2014).
194. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE, 162-74 (Brian D. Smedley, Adrienne Y. Stith, & Alan R.
Nelson, eds. 2003).
195. Health Coverage by Race and Ethnicity: The Potential Impact of the Affordable
Care Act, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1, 5 (Mar. 2013),
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/8423-health-coverage-by-race-
and-ethnicity.pdf.
196. Matthew, supra note 193, at 4-5.
197. 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (1984); see, e.g., Laura D. Hermer, Medicaid, Low Income
Pools, and the Goals of Privatization, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 405, 414 (2010)
(demonstrating that at least some groups arguably intended quite the opposite).
198. 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2) (1997).
199. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2016).
200. Julia Paradise, Medicaid Moving Forward, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 09,
2015), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/medicaid-moving-forward.
201. See Huberfeld & Roberts, supra note 15, at 47.
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varying times.20 2 However, with the gradual delinking of Medicaid from cash
welfare and the Affordable Care Act's expansion of Medicaid to all
financially eligible, non-elderly adults in expansion states, it is arguably
becoming increasingly difficult to cogently claim that Medicaid should be
reserved only for the most impoverished and vulnerable groups and should
be at most a temporary crutch for the poor, rather than a health care mainstay
for populations that lack real and stable access to regular and necessary
medical care.20 3
Nevertheless, the Trump administration's tone and messaging may
threaten a growth in Medicaid stigmatization. Members of the
administration's executive branch have communicated an unquestionably
dismissive attitude toward welfare programs, welfare recipients, and poverty
in general. 2°4 For example, in 2017, Ben Carson, the Secretary of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, opined that "poverty to a
large extent is ... a state of mind. You take somebody that has the right
mindset, you can take everything from them and put them on the street, and
I guarantee in a little while they'll be right back up there." 205 Similarly, Mick
Mulvaney, the head of the Office of Management and Budget, defended the
Trump budget's massive cuts to a panoply of programs for low-income
Americans by saying, "[w]e're no longer going to measure compassion by
the number of programs or the number of people on those programs, but by
the number of people we help get off of those programs," and that cutting
programs "is how you can help people take charge of their own lives
"206again...
Given this current political climate, the question remains as to whether
202. Jeanne M. Lambrew, Making Medicaid a Block Grant Program: An Analysis of the
Implications of Past Proposals, 83 MILBANK Q. 41, 52-55 (2005) (discussing problematic
impacts of block grant proposals on Medicaid); see also, 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(a) (2017)
(permitting states to provide certain groups of Medicaid beneficiaries with "benchmark
benefits" that may differ from and be more limited than benefits provided to other groups of
beneficiaries in the state, as enacted in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005).
203. See, e.g., Huberfeld & Roberts, supra note 15, at 37-38 (discussing the myth that
working for pay eliminates dependence).
204. Julie Hirschfield Davis, Trump's Budget Cuts Deeply into Medicaid and Anti-
Poverty Efforts, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/us/politics/trump-budget-cuts.html (noting that Mark
Meadows, the chairman of the "conservative" House Freedom Caucus, remarked that Trump's
proposed elimination of funding for "Meals on Wheels, even for some of us who are
considered to be fiscal hawks, may be a bridge too far").
205. Jose A. DelReal, Ben Carson Calls Poverty 'a State of Mind' During Interview,
WASH. POST (May 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2017/05/24/ben-carson-calls-poverty-a-state-of-mind-during-
interview/?utm term=.e3f6Obe6e7eO.
206. Press Briefing on the FY2018 Budget, WHITE HOUSE OFF. PRESS SEC. (May 23,
2017, 11:12 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/O5/23/press-briefing-
fy2018-budget.
Vol. 27
What to Expect When You're Expecting
Medicaid personal responsibility requirements, directive and paternalistic by
nature, will not only make it more difficult for individuals to qualify for and
obtain Medicaid benefits, but also saddle them with a renewed stigma of
alleged shiftlessness and dependence.20 If so, to what extent might this
additional stigma negatively affect the treatment they receive from health
care professionals? Given that physicians hold biases that are similar to those
in the general population, it would be reasonable to expect that if the general
population increased bias toward welfare recipients after the enactment of
PRWORA, physicians likely shared in that bias.208 While the match between
the programs and different factors at issue are imperfect at best, they provide
some insight as to what we may expect by considering attitudes toward cash
welfare prior to and following the enactment of PRWORA in 1996." 9
One study by Jeffrey Will analyzed public opinion research regarding cash
welfare recipients from the Depression to the early 1990s, before the
inception of TANF.21° The study found a longstanding dichotomy regarding
public perception of welfare and those who receive it.1 On the one hand,
public opinion data consistently upheld the notion that no one should be
hungry or otherwise in need of the basics of life.212 On the other hand, a
plurality or slight majority reported that they believe people on welfare are
dishonest and lack integrity.2 3 The same study found that study participants
viewed hypothetical families seeking welfare as "more deserving" if they
needed welfare for reasons beyond their control, or if the mother was actively
seeking work.21 4 Participants were less sympathetic toward hypothetical
families where the mother was not seeking work, or was picky about job
choices.215
A 2007 study found that public opinion of cash welfare recipients barely
changed from the pre-TANF era to the post-TANF era.21 6 The authors
performed a meta-analysis of studies using different but roughly analogous
207. Id.
208. Matthew, supra note 194, at 5.
209. Id.
210. See Jeffry A. Will, The Dimensions of Poverty: Public Perceptions of the Deserving
Poor, 22 Soc. Sci. REs. 312, 312-13 (1993).
211. Id. at 316.
212. Id. at 314-15.
213. Id. at 315.
214. Id. at 329.
215. Id.
216. Joe Soss & Sanford F. Schram, A Public Transformed? WelWare Reform as Policy
Feedback, 101 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 111, 115-17 (2007) ("In sum, then, we find evidence of
issue negation... but no transformation of views on welfare policy, welfare recipients, and the
poor.... After 1996, welfare faded from the public agenda, but underlying images of welfare
and policy-relevant groups shifted little.").
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questions from two time periods: 1989 and the early 2000s.21 The study
found that, during both time periods, anywhere between nearly half to over
seventy percent of respondents agreed with statements that welfare recipients
are dependent, lazy, or have little incentive to work.218 The public appeared
to be sympathetic to those in dire economic straits for reasons perceived
beyond their control, but were less likely to be sympathetic towards
individuals who made what appear to be poor life choices. 21 9 The intervening
reforms putting time limits on cash welfare and requiring a substantial
percentage of recipients to work appear to have made little change to the
public's view of these populations. 22 The results suggest that, if similar
reforms are imposed on certain Medicaid beneficiaries, the changes may only
make it more difficult for beneficiaries to obtain or maintain benefits. 1
However, the proposed reforms may not alter the attitudes that physicians
and others have toward beneficiaries, or make beneficiaries more likely to
receive discriminatory or substandard care.222
IV. CONCLUSION
Medicaid and cash welfare are by no means analogous. But if public
perception of Medicaid beneficiaries on whom time limits and work
requirements are imposed follows a similar trend to that observed in TANF,
then the impending waiver requirements may have little effect on public
opinion, and thus, quite possibly also on providers' opinions of Medicaid
beneficiaries. 3 Physicians have a history of problems with treating
Medicaid patients, including bias against what they view as negative
characteristics of Medicaid beneficiaries.224 However, evidence suggests that
impending personal responsibility requirements in some states' programs
may not exacerbate those biases. 5
Work requirements may, depending on implementation, have a negative
effect on adult, non-disabled, non-elderly Medicaid beneficiaries, although
the majority already work anyway. 6 Negative effects will depend greatly on
how those requirements will be implemented and enforced, who will be
217. Id. at 115.
218. Id. at 115-16.
219. Soss & Schram, supra note 216, at 116.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 107-09.
224. Will, supra note 210.
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., Garfield, Rudowitz, & Damico, supra note 7 (finding that "among the 24
million non-SSI adults (ages 19-64) enrolled in Medicaid in 2015, 6 in 10 (59%) are working
themselves").
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exempted from them, and how much flexibility states will use in imposing
them in the event of a changing economic landscape, such as another
recession. As for time limits, they are both counterintuitive and
counterproductive in the context of Medicaid.22 Given the well-documented
ill effects of being uninsured, it would be imprudent to implement a policy
that encourages eligible beneficiaries to go uninsured rather than risk running
out of coverage when they really need it.
Non-disabled, non-elderly, non-pregnant Medicaid beneficiaries in states
like Kentucky, Maine, and Indiana will likely experience negative effects
from personal responsibility requirements, presuming the Secretary of HHS
grants their respective waivers. Time limits would be particularly
problematic. However, as long as funding remains open and states are
required to carefully collect data, rigorously evaluate their waiver programs,
and make changes when warranted, many of the TANF-style changes that
some states seek may not have as dire an effect on beneficiaries and the care
they receive as one might initially worry. Time may soon tell.
227. Id. at 120.
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